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Resumen
La democracia deliberativa es un ideal normativo de democracia. Este modelo no solo constituye una propuesta para la rege-
neración de la legitimidad de nuestras instituciones, sino también un mecanismo para la toma de decisiones. Se basa en dos 
dimensiones: una dimensión procesal de acuerdo con la cual el modelo exige la inclusión y una capacidad igual de influir en la deci-
sión final de todos los afectados (Cohen, 1989; Bohman, 1996; Habermas, 1992…) y una dimensión sustantiva donde las decisiones 
políticas se toman a través de un procedimiento colectivo a través de la argumentación y el debate público. Si estas condiciones se 
respetan, las decisiones serán más racionales y mejores. Este artículo tiene dos objetivos. En primer lugar presentaré los elementos 
clave de esta concepción epistémica de la legitimidad política. En segundo lugar voy a mostrar los retos a los que se enfrenta. Por 
un lado, el carácter contrafáctico de muchos de sus propuestas y por el otro, los problemas obvios del evidente sesgo consensua-
listade este modelo. 
Abstract
Deliberative democracy is a normative ideal of democracy. 
This model is a proposal for the regeneration of the legitimacy 
of our institutions, but also a mechanism for decision making. It 
is based on two different dimensions: a procedural dimension, 
where the model demands the inclusion and an equal capacity 
to influence the final decision of all those affected (Cohen, 1989; 
Bohman, 1996; Habermas, 1992 ...) and a substantive dimen-
sion where the political decisions are made through a collective 
procedure of argumentation and public discussion. If these 
conditions are recognized, the decisions will be more rational 
and better. This paper has two aims. First, I will present the key 
elements of this epistemic conception of political legitimacy. 
Secondly, I will show the challenges it faces. On the one hand, 
Resumo
A democracia deliberativa é um ideal normativo de democracia. 
Este modelo não só constitui uma proposta para a regene-
ração da legitimidade das nossas instituições, mas também 
um mecanismo para a tomada de decisões. Baseia-se em duas 
dimensões: uma dimensão processual de acordo com a qual 
o modelo exige a inclusão e uma capacidade igual de influir 
na decisão final de todos os afetados (Cohen, 1989; Bohmam, 
1996; Habermas, 1992…) e uma dimensão substantiva onde 
as decisões políticas tomam-se através de um procedimento 
coletivo através da argumentação e o debate público. Se estas 
condições se respeitam, as decisões serão mais racionais e 
melhores. Este artigo tem dos objetivos. Em primeiro lugar apre-
sentarei os elementos chave de esta concepção epistêmica da 
legitimidade política. Em segundo lugar vou mostrar os retos 
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the counterfactual of many of its postulates and on the other, the 
obvious problems of consensualist bias of this model 
aos  que se enfrenta. Por um lado, o caráter contrafático 
de muitas das suas propostas e pelo outro, os problemas 
óbvios do evidente sesgo com consensualidade deste 
modelo. 
27
Has the Deliberative Model of Democracy an epistemic value?
Panorama | 23 - 37 | Volumen 7, número 12 | Enero - Junio 2013
Introduction
Most authors have defended that the deliberative democracy has an epistemic value. According to them, 
deliberation is a mechanism for the search of truth (Bohman, 1996: 6; Richardson, 2002: 76; Cfr. Habermas, 1992). 
However, this justification is plagued with problems. 
Liberals defend a presumption in favor of individual liberty and limited liberty only to protect the equal 
rights of others. In this sense, they underline a priority of “just” above the considerations of “good life”. Thisis essen-
tially the liberal way of thinking about a just society. It denies the existence of anything that transcends individual 
preferences. Liberalism understands democracy as a formal and neutral procedure. According to it the legitimacy of 
the rules derives from the endorsement by the representatives in the Parliament following the established procedure. 
The justification of decisions can only be derived from adopting a procedure that ensures fairness and equity. From 
this perspective, the main objective of the policy will be the best compromise between private, opposite and irrecon-
cilable interests, and explicitly refuses anything that transcends private preferences. 
On the contrary, Jürgen Habermas claims that the moral agreementis possible. It is derived from a partic-
ular process of communication. A communication oriented to mutual understanding and this is subjected to several 
criteria for measuring the quality of dialogue (“Real Speech Situation”). The result of this process is a rational agree-
ment, a rational consensus (Cfr. Habermas, 2000: 21). When we attribute epistemic value to this consensus, we assume 
that if this unanimous decision is the result of a deliberative process, it will be a sufficient condition to assert its moral 
rightness. If these conditions of measuring deliberation qualitywere recognized, the decisions would be correct from 
a moral point of view and they would be more rational and better.
.This work has two relevant dimensions. First, the plural character of our societies raises doubts about the 
real possibility of moral substantive agreement. Second, despite the resonance of Habermas’s studies, the theoretical 
arguments have been presented without empirical evidence or a robust explanation. Both aspects will be addressed 
in this paper. 
In this paper I will expose the weaknesses of the justification of deliberative democracy. First, I will 
describe the Habermasian deliberative model. Then, I will present the essential elements of this epistemic conception 
of democracy. This characterization is necessary in order to recognize the elements of this epistemic conception of 
democracy. Secondly, I will contrast their assumptions with the reality. In this sense, I will present some empirical 
evidences. These evidences will  resolvedoubts about the benefits and the epistemic value of the deliberative model. 
The habermasian deliberative model
Habermas’s proposal is original in the following sense: the moral universalism of Habermas depends on 
a dialogical procedure of communication. This procedure is oriented to mutual understanding and this is subjected 
to several criteria for measuring the quality of dialogue (“Real Speech Situation”). According to this, this model is 
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different from John Rawls’smonological model and the contemporary republican model - where the deliberation 
depends on virtuous participation of citizens, who are committed to the common good. This ideal deliberation allows 
us to reach a rational agreement.
Habermas resorted to an analysis of our communicative practices. In Theory of Communicative 
Action,Habermas supposes there is a close relation betweenrationality and knowledge, “who have knowledge, can be 
more or less rational”. According to this, there are two types of actions, in accordance with the status of the rules that 
govern the behavior: we can find goal-directed actions we meet the rational action and teleological actionswithin. 
Communicative action is distinguished by Habermas from other forms of action. Communicative action is action 
based upon this deliberative process, where two or more individuals interact and coordinate their action agreed upon 
interpretations of the situation (Habermas, 1984: 86).
Habermas identifies and reconstructs a series of universal conditions or “universal validity claims” in the 
structures of argumentative speech. Within communicative action an agent must necessarily engage these claims 
and believe that such claims can be made.
The argument relies on the following assumptions: 
(1) communication can proceed between two individuals only on the basis of a consensus 
regarding the validity claims raised by the speech acts they exchange; 
(2) these validity claims concern at least three dimensions of validity: a) truthfulness, b) 
rightness, and c) truth.
(3) this mutual understanding is maintained on the basis of the shared presupposition that 
any validity claim agreed upon could be justified, if necessary, by having recourse to good 
reasons.
In other words, a speaker claims not only that what they say is true (c), but also that it is normatively right 
(b) and honest (a). Moreover, the speaker implicitly offers to justify these claims if they are challenged with reasons. 
The actions of the actors are not coordinated via egocentric calculations of interest, but they do lead to mutual 
understanding (Cfr. Habermas, 2001: 385). 
This approach involves a “procedural view of rationality”. Habermas situates rationality as aninherent 
capacity within language, especially in the form of argumentation. The validity of any norm may be subjected to this 
rational checkout, that is, this discursive procedure. In other words, rationality is a characteristic of the process by 
which the decision is made. “The intrinsic characteristics of the process allow for attributing a rational value to the 
decisions. The rationality inherent in this practice is seen in the fact that a communicatively achieved agreement 
must be ultimately based on reasons. And the rationality of those who participate in this communicative practice is 
determined by whether, if necessary, they could, under suitable circumstances, provide reasons for their expressions” 
(Habermas, 1984:17). 
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He equated empirical truth with ideal justifiability—a consensus theory of truth-. According to that theory, 
the “truth condition of propositions is the potential assent of all others”; thus “the universal-pragmatic meaning of 
truth… is determined by the demand of reaching a rational consensus” (Habermas, 1971/2001: 86, 89). Such formula-
tions suggest that Habermas equated the meaning of truth with the outcome of a universal, rational consensus, which 
he understood in reference to the ideal speech situation (Habermas, 1971/2001: 97–98). 
In a moral dimension, Habermas translates this consensus theory of truth, thus, he summarizes his ideal-
ized conception of practical discourse in the “discourse principle”: A rule of action or choice is justified, and thus valid, 
only if all those affected by the rule or choice could accept it in a reasonable discourse (Habermas, 1990: 66, 93).The 
Discourse principle thus applies moral rightness and ethical authenticity.
In other words,“ideal speech situation” acts as a regulative ideal. Habermas providing one set of criteria 
for measuring the quality of discourse refers to structural features: inclusiveness, equal communicative rights, the 
absence of repression or manipulation. Other criteria concern required dispositions of participants: reflexive attitudes 
towards one’s own claims, willingness to take the demands and the counterarguments of the other seriously, and 
sincerity or the absence of manipulation and self deception (Habermas, 2005: 39-40). In this vein, for Habermas, the 
legitimacy of an authority only comes from a democratic process that allows a reasonable assumption for rational 
acceptance of their results (Habermas, 1992, 2005). The result of this procedure is the consensus, however, this does 
not mean the possibility of the persistence of deep ethical disagreement, like Rawls. For Habermas, the participants in 
a deliberation have to make a decision rationally motivated and it becomes from the same reasons” (Habermas, 1998: 
161). In conclusion, the idea of legitimacy depends on the fulfillment of two essential conditions: 1) satisfying the 
procedural requirements for a correct procedure (formal legitimacy) and 2) the rational acceptability of the results of 
this procedure (substantive acceptability). 
An epistemic conception of democracy
When we attribute epistemic value to this consensus, we assume that this unanimous decision is the 
result of a deliberative process. This means that:First, the existence of a correctness standard. This standard allows us 
to know when a decision is correct. In our case, this standard is the “ideal speech situation”. According to Habermas 
this ideal situation operates like a criterion of decisioncorrectness. This “ideal situation” imposes regulatory condi-
tions to the deliberative process (regulative ideal), the conditions of the process allow to attribute a rational value to 
the decisions. The legitimacy of decisions exclusively derived from these procedural conditions (Cfr. Perez Zafrilla, 
2009, p. 158).
Secondly, there is a procedure: deliberation, that allows making those right decisions. According to the 
first point, this procedure should be subjected to these normative conditions that operate as a standard for assessing 
the quality of the dialogue.
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Thirdly and finally, the goal of these deliberative processes is the agreement among all participants. This 
agreement represents the right or the best decisions from the formal or procedural point of view but also it is the best 
from a substantive point of view. 
In other words, Habermasian deliberative model is understood as a process that produces consensus. 1) 
The Habermasian deliberative model conceives the deliberation as a mechanism to discern the “rightness” of the 
rules of action, 2) It maintains a concept of consensus, particularly rigid because it requires a minimum agreement 
from the basis of the same substantive reasons resulting from the deliberative process itself; reasons are independent 
of the particular interpretations of good too. 3) It is possible because the process is subjected to strict procedural 
criteria, but also participants are subjected to the strict requirements of the communicative rationality (a reflexive 
attitude towards one’s own beliefs and background assumptions, willingness to take the demands and the counterar-
guments of the other seriously, and sincerity or the absence if manipulation and self-deception. 
The assumptions of deliberation
Liberal democracy involves a minimal sense of autonomy and equality. The main value in democracy is 
the basic political equality among all citizens, understood as a “prima facie” equal right to influence or determinate 
political decisions. The citizens are considered autonomous, they make their own choices and they have a basic and 
equal right to participation. All this constitutes democracy. This presupposes that none of us possesses an infallible 
epistemology. On the contrary, deliberative democracy represents an alternative point of view to this “pure procedur-
alist” conception of democracy and the “substantive” conceptions of democracy.
Deliberative democracy is an alternative ideal of political legitimacy. Ideally speaking, political decisions 
are considered legitimate if they are the product of a deliberative procedure of decision-making. The decisions, that 
are the result of a deliberation, are more legitimate because they have been adopted by procedural conditions that 
allow fair decisions. But, these decisions would not only be legitimate, but also they would be correct because they 
have been adopted on the basis of the best argument-of the rational argument. In this sense, the idea of epistemic 
value is the main source of moral validity of the deliberative model and the main argument in its defense.
In the deliberative democracy, political decisions are to be made through a collective procedure of argu-
mentation where arguing consists in exchanging reasons, oriented to the goal of rationally convincing others, instead 
of strategic participation oriented to impose personal political preferences or desires on others (Manin, 1987, 352 and 
353; Cohen, 1989, 17-21; Estlund, 1993; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Christiano, 1996, 53-55; Fishkin and Laslett 
2003, 2); and it is supposed to lead us, at least ideally, to rational consensus.Deliberation assumes, as we have seen, 
both the existence of rightness (or impartiality, or some other equivalent) in political decisions, and the possibility to 
know which is the right (or impartial) decision (Cohen, 1986, Estlund, 1997: 174; Christiano, 1997). 
In other words, when we attribute epistemic value to this procedure, this means that:
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First, it is the existence of a correctness standard. This standard allows us to know when a decision is 
correct. In our case, this standard is the “Real speech situation”. According to Habermas, this ideal situation operates 
like a criterion of decision correctness. This “ideal situation” imposes regulatory conditions to the deliberative process 
(regulative ideal), the conditions of the process allow to attribute a rational value to the decisions. 
Second, there is a procedure:deliberation, which allows getting those right decisions. According to the 
first point, this procedure should be subject to these normative conditions that operate as standard for assessing the 
quality of the dialogue.
The goal of these deliberative processes is the agreement among all participants. This agreement repre-
sents the right or the best decisions from the formal or procedural point of view but also it is the best from a 
substantive point of view. In other words, the legitimacy of decisions does not only derive exclusively from these 
procedural conditions. The idea of legitimacy depends on the fulfillment of two essential conditions: 1) satisfying the 
procedural requirements for a correct procedure (formal legitimacy) and 2) the rational acceptability of the results of 
this procedure (substantive acceptability).
In this sense, the deliberation could primarilybe defined as a qualified form of communication whose 
conditions under which it operates allows the beliefs, values and preferences of citizens to change and be more 
rational, thus allowing to find points in common. 
It is possible because in all cases:
1) We assume “deliberative capacities” of the individuals. A successful deliberation depends on cognitive 
and moral capacities. Citizens who are able to have or create their own beliefs and preferences, with ability to consider 
alternatives and an attitude to receive favorable and serious demands and counter-arguments of others, etc., are 
required for deliberation. In other words, individuals are rational, ethical and moral agents. Individuals are explicitly 
assumed to have a basic cognitive capacity to argue with reasons, to recognize criteria of justification, to be logical 
and to reflect on their own presuppositions.
However, the research suggests that individual’s capacities are less than assumed by deliberative democ-
racy. Second, the use of the information and the formation of the individual judgments depend on contextual factors 
and important cognitive factors. 
The empirical studies suggest that the individuals are not particularly rational and logical in their judg-
ments. They show the important influence of cognitive factors in the formation of their judgments: the use of heuristic 
(Cfr. Downs 1957; Popkin, 1991; Sniderman, 1992), prejudices and stereotypes (Cfr. Miller, 1992) cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger, 1957) or pre-existing strong emotional commitments and preferences. Many studies have drawn attention 
to the powerful influence of cognitive factors: “cognitive victories”, this invites us to consider important factors like the 
memory, the attention or remembering the arguments (CfrLupia 2002). 
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Moreover, the information comes from our political environment (mass media, political parties…), but the 
final use depends on a complex interaction of factors like our “conscience”, our values, knowledge, etc ... People do 
not have a full catalogue of opinions, people possess a number of considerations that may compete with each other, 
and their salience depends on the contextual framework (Cfr. Converse, 1964, Zaller, 1992).
2. It assumes a problematic presupposition regarding the nature of communication and group dynamics. The delibera-
tion is presented as a communication normatively constrained, communication that aims to change the content of, intensity 
of, or reasons for the preferences, beliefs, actions or interpretations of one´s interlocutors with respect to matters of 
public concern (Neblo, 2005: 174).
These conditions should ensure to reach agreement, a consensus among all participants. A consensus 
that, in the deliberative theory, appears as an expression of the rationality and the moral rightness.
In this light, deliberative democracy theory understands the communication as anessentially non-prob-
lematic phenomenon. Communication would not be more than a neutral vehicle for the transport of subjectively 
constructed views, a mere epiphenomenon resulting from the dynamic or cognitive structures of individuals and 
social structure. A minimal analysis of the latest research shows that communicative exchanges determine the quality 
of cognition. While the quality of the structures of communication are clearly affected by the cognitive abilities of the 
individuals involved, these cognitive abilities are themselves, at least in part a product of communicative exchanges in 
which individuals are regularly involved (Rosenberg 2002).
Moreover, the desirability of the deliberative process is derived from the real possibility of reaching a 
consensus. But obviously,any convergence of views cannot be regarded as relevant. Deliberative theory requires a 
qualified consensus, a rational agreement. This view has important implications, and suggests one question: how can 
we evaluate the consensus really reached? 
The evaluation of consensus is a factual matter. We will only know the rational character of the real 
consensus if we examine the conditions under which consensus has been made. In this vein, then, the important 
thing is not the effective consensus, but the criteria of rationality introduced to qualify it.
Secondly, it is not sure that the consensus will be a necessary result of this communication process. The 
empirical studies about group processes challenge this idea. It is argued that we do not behave in the same way when 
we act individually than when we represent a group or we are part of one. There would be an important phenomenon 
as “discontinuity” or “groupthink”. First, the concept of discontinuity refers to the idea that the existence of the group 
itself has a crucial impact on the behavior of individuals (Cfr. Ash, 1951, 1956). In this light the pressure on individuals 
and groups can induce that the individuals in a minority position would tend to accommodate their opinion to the 
opinion of the majority. Secondly, the tendency to unanimity among group members may be due to the groupthink 
phenomenon. This concept describes the tendency of individuals engaged in group process to change their prefer-
ences in the sense of the majority (Cfr. Janis 1972). Moreover, deliberation might transform preferences; democratic 
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deliberation might help to accomplish this by allowing relevant constituencies to sort out and hopefully reduce the 
dimensions over which they disagree. But it is a real possibility that, it might even exacerbate conflict. This might 
occur in at least two ways. First, disagreement and conflict are not only the starting point of deliberation but a primary 
creative resource. As a creative process, however, deliberation might well proliferate rather than diminish understand-
ings of what is at stake in a given political contest. Secondly, even if deliberation does induce a shared understanding 
of the dimensions of conflict, this may serve simply to focus attention on the depth of disagreement. A participant 
may conclude that “if this is what is at stake, then I really disagree (Knight y Johson, 1994: 286; Cfr. Sunstein, 2002)1. 
The real problem is that deliberative democracy presupposes that consensus is possible and preferable to 
conflict. The consensus represents a more rational and better decision and the real possibility of moral agreement. 
The use of public and rational discussion as a mechanism of deactivation of the conflict and differences in the field of 
ethical and political reflections. However, conflict and consensus are two sides of the same coin, are two dimensions 
of political phenomena. In deliberative theory the relationship between conflict and consensus means that there is 
a sequence where the conflict is the starting point and the consensus is the point of arrival. However, the interrela-
tionship between conflict and consensus is much more complex. The possibility of consensus does not eliminate 
the possibility of conflict in general, because this is an intrinsic dimension of the concept of politics. Moreover, the 
consensus is not necessarily desirable, because it might be oppressive, “nullify the symbolic dimension of the game 
between authority and opposition” (Maldonado, 2007: 46, Cfr. Shapiro, 2002: 199; Mouffe, 1993).
The consensus is not a necessary result of the deliberative process. It is possible that the individual or 
group of individuals, exercising their personal autonomy, refuse to accept the consensus and thus become dissi-
dent. This dissent should constitute the basis of legitimacy. According to Muguerza, it would be a lower limit to the 
consensus, when according to our consciousness we determine that the collective decision violates my human 
condition” (1990: 682) “imperative of dissent” or “alternative of dissent”.
This tension between the universality of consensus and individual autonomy and the possibility that the 
deliberative process does not necessarily culminate in anagreement are powerful reasons. We need to consider the 
possibility of reasonable disagreement and dissent as possible results of the deliberative process and we need to 
think of alternatives to consensus as the key to the legitimacy of political decisions. 
Conclusions
In this paper, I have attempted to offer an understanding of the epistemic value of the democratic delib-
eration. First we saw that deliberative democracy is not only a model of legitimacy of political decisions but also a 
decision-making mechanism. In this vein, the attribution of epistemic value to the deliberation means that decisions 
reached under this model were better and more rational. According to Habermas the legitimacy of an authority 
only comes from a democratic process that allows a reasonable assumption for rational acceptance of their results 
1  Here the crucial point is the "force of the better argument". Other forms of influence are explicitly excluded, so that interlocutors are free to be convinced with 
reasons.  
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(Habermas, 1992, 2005). The result of this procedure is the consensus; this does mean the possibility of the solution 
of deep ethical disagreement. For Habermas, the participants in a deliberation have to get a decision rationally moti-
vated and it becomes from the same reasons” (Habermas, 1998: 161). In other words, he defends a rigid concept of 
consensus which has an epistemic value and represents the best and more rational decision.
Secondly, we provided an overview of the constituent elements of the epistemic justification of deliberative 
democracy. In this light, we have seen as the success of deliberation depends on the important assumptions about 
the deliberative capacities of citizens, the nature of communication processes and group dynamics. Finally,I have 
examined some empirical studies which suggest that the deliberative assumptions regarding the cognitive capaci-
ties of individualsare incorrect and that communication is more than just a neutral medium or vehicle. Moreover, I 
have shown that the consensus is not a necessary result of the deliberation procedure, and it is possible that the 
deliberation exacerbated conflict or created a false consensus. This suggests that we need to think of alternatives to 
consensus as the key to the legitimacy of political decisions.
It is true that that deliberative democracy is a counterfactual model and a regulative ideal. But the real 
problem is that deliberation is usually treated as a decision-making procedure with important cognitive and political 
benefits. However, this approach falls short to appreciate the consequences of the deliberative process. The role of 
empirical evidences in theories of deliberation should not be counted as evidence for or against deliberation, but it 
can show the various dimensions of success and the means of achieving them. A satisfactory answer to this question 
should entail measures to enhance the democratic capacity of citizens and the group dynamics in different participa-
tory practices within the public sphere.
Unless the capacity gained within these practices is visibly and comprehensibly linked to actual decision-
making processes, this model will only be a vain aspiration. 
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